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Medium - A World In Between

Intention

1. We are undertaking something here. And that is that. This sentence is enough if it offers a prospect of everything that can be said and shown. Something that we say should be something. By taking something on we are immediately encircled by everything that comes into question. But this is about nothing other than this something, in its apparently unavoidable presence.

And that is what everything is about: it is about the state of things. About the possibilities and conditions of their presentation. About the existential situation of being forced by something into all kinds of statements that claim to define and to convey something. By expressing our intention we are starting to discuss the status of this thing that we are inclined to say must be something, represent something, mean something. Hopelessly.

2.

As we can see the intention is immediately enough to tempt us to produce more sentences. The contradiction is obvious. The first sentence is not enough. We think it says something, explains something, but it is by no means clear how this something is arrived at. This something of which we speak, as we speak. All that happens is that another something appears as well, and takes the place of the previous something. And not a word is said about how it comes into being. But that is what this about. And so even the other sentences are not enough for the time being.

But we are not going to shift. With our express intention. Ultimately that anticipates everything. For if we decide to do something only to replace this something with all the jumble of another something, we do not get any nearer the cause that leads to something. And why, of all things, we are forced to undertake something by asking ourselves such questions at all.

3.

When we undertake to make a thorough investigation of how something comes about at all, we are thrown back on shall we say: productive and reproductive processes. Our attention is drawn to the element before that, the point at which we rely on our ability to come up with something. <Something> that we assert is something, represents something, means something. <Something> that we have confirmed by the ability to perceive. <Something> apparently comes into being in that perception convinces us that it must be about something. But how does that happen? What produces the perception that leads to the impression that we have something before us that we say is something? How do we proceed here? How do we tackle it? We undertake to do something! And that is all. And all at once.

4.

The basis for the outline of our express intention here is what is close to us, something that is familiar to us as creative practice: Gestaltung. It is perfectly clear where our undertaking comes from: the Museum und Schule für Gestaltung, in Zurich.

The everyday world of creative practice and the way in which it is ritualized is affected, uninterruptedly and directly, by the existential powers of production, output (poiesis) on the one hand and perception, input (aesthesis) on the other. Creative practice is probably inconceivable unless these two powers are constitutionally involved, and instrumentalized. It is precisely this that makes it something. But not just that. Ideally the creative act undertakes something - and thus repeatedly invites question about what is meant as <something> in each case. We can make use of this questionableness, taking the example of creative practice, which we illustrate here as follows.

Poietic practice

1.

The creative act of production consists first of all of asserting that an autonomous subject exists; this makes it easier for the authentic tracking of objectifications and creative events to be represented in their sensually tangible qualification. These traces are again an assertion of being that serves as the heading for a possible paradigm of what comes into question as an artefact, in general and in particular.

2.

A plausible reduction of what is suggested by assertion of being is that it can be perceived. The creative act produces something; something, in some form, of which we can say that it is open to the possibilities of perception. Thus, even at this stage, poiesis and aesthesis are taking each other's hands. They seem to be mutually dependent, indeed in creative practice they are inseparably linked, for better or for worse.

3.

The creative act of production as such can be described by a canon of characteristic processes and interventions, in all its conventionalized stages from draft to realization. Thus for instance the definite transition from an unmarked condition to a possible manifestation that appears in this way and claims to represent something is called <articulation>.

4.

And so where at a previous moment in time there is still nothing to be perceived in situ that could be seen as the assertion of existence of a poietic manifestation, perception acquires something at a later point in time through the effective force of the articulating intervention. Something seems to be there. In some form.

Produced: sentences, sketches, that anticipate a realization that is to come, as is the case in creative practice.

5.

Now the creative act would not be what it is asserted to be as a complex state if it did not work on the express intention of wishing to represent something through the canon of exploratory and tested interventions. Creative practice defines the focus of this anticipatory intention as: idea, something about which it is already difficult to say what it <is>.

6.

The identity and autonomy of the creative subject are explained - among other things - by the fact that this is about something that can be called an idea. The canon of interventions is triggered by this unconditional requirement of having an idea: the idea is part of the <common sense> of the creative act.

Creative practice substantiates this assumption by repeatedly applying and justifying the determining intervention. It articulates, concretizes and realizes objectifications and creative events in their sensually tangible qualifications, something that is - not least - perceived as notorious traces of ideas.

7.

But how is an idea arrived at?

Purely and simply by an assertion of being, supported in some form by a resultant perception. The situation repeats itself; it is not the first and not the last time. What was said about the transition to a possible articulation of something also applies here. It is just that at first sight the concept of the manifestation is not quite accurate, because the idea is not sufficiently obvious. Intuition, inspiration, imagination, <inner picture> and other metaphors play around the myth of this form of being, but this does not place it in doubt. On the contrary. Design practice shows that this something that asserts itself as an idea is based on a feeling.

Eureka! But that is more easily said than shown.

8.

But what happens before this assertion of being, before this crucial moment when the creating subject trusts the impression of having an idea?

The autonomous subject undertakes! It is too soon to say: something. What is to be considered is how we arrive at this something that is posited as an idea by

creative practice. The space of time in which we have to manage without the object of a named idea is accompanied by imploring gestures like <finding out>, <looking>, <reflecting>. We give this grey area the heading <idealizing> - it is an intervention by the creative act that points the way.

9.

The initial intervention of preparatory and profound idealizing makes all previous assertions of being seem questionable to us. In fact the questions get out of hand. We assume that the reliability of the assertion of being is turning out to be frail and unsuitable at this stage of the creative process. Immediately. Everything that is obviously an object of human perception is relativized and undermined by the direct experience of idealizing: outlines, consistencies, the coherence of tangible compositions, the insistence of forms and figures with their correspondences in terms of content, all these lose their current certainty, all at once. They dissolve to a certain extent <morphologically>, in front of the <inner eye>, as it sees the creative process. We are tempted to speak of ontogenetic and phenotypic deconstruction, which - of course - does not think of stopping when faced with the identity of the autonomous subject, which is equally seized in its assertion of being by the poietic process. For this reason eye and hand are dramatically prone to this element of momentarily losing the sense of <having something>.

10.

Everything seems to start moving, everything is in a state of turmoil, of flux. But something - is missing.

This muddle is accompanied by a feeling that everything is disappearing and at the same time that everything is possible, until finally <something> crystallizes out that forces perception to believe that it corresponds to an idea. Something? The question still stands. It can mean a constellation, the aggregate condition of a construction, an arrangement, the concentration of a structured quality, something in some form that is staged by the interventions and processes of poiesis, so that it can be caught in flagranti by perception as something that can be linked with the assertion of being of an idea, and distances itself from being unfocused as a possibility for tangibility. As a poietic construct.

11.

With the aid of perception the transition from a diffuse continuity to the consistency of something that approximates to the sense of an idea is confirmed - and subsequently makes it easier to articulate in the tentative manifestation of its validity or feasibility. With a view to realization as a completed artefact.

Aesthetic practice

1.

Now we can see similarities between the situation in which the autonomous subject is displaced by the intentionality of the creative adventure, and the competences that determine the act of perception. We will put this in another way:

2.

The impression triggers <something>; that is how the experience is described. Something, really something? The so-called directness of the act of perception, in which - as for example in conditions of extreme astonishment - the perceiving subject goes to work on the impression, pursues the impression and forgets itself for a short time, seems once more to affect everything that could be considered an assertion of being.

Phenotypic assurances, logical-causal dependencies start to lose their weight in their convenient aspectualization of the fundamental categories. Their anchorages are being encroached upon. The rules are suspended. Intentional centring and the extensional scope of localization and temporalization, tried-and-tested links within the syntactical-semantic network,

taxinomic hierarchies and pragmatic finalities are neutralized by being impressed.

This also applies to the autonomous subjects assertion of being, as opposed to an intact substantial-formal identity of a so-called object. In the momentary upheaval caused by the pull of the impression the so-called subject finds itself in a condition or better non-condition of disorientation. Differences cease to exist. The impression triggers: something that gets lost as a result.

3.

This vacuum of lack of structure and relativity is brought to a temporary end by adopting the poietic power. The subject comes to something - maybe to <thinking things over>. Poiesis comes to terms with aesthesis by systematically allowing the apparatus of form-finding parameters, the structured quality of ensuring arrangements, to click into place, and by creating a sense of direction using elementary measures. The opposite comes out into the open: by applying the poietic power, which lends a hand to perception, the subject can assert itself as autonomous again in terms of an identified object. Chronology and topology gain a foothold. The syntactical-semantic inventory and the required connections are properly in place.

Something that shuts down as an impression finds something that turns out to be an expression. Tempted by something into being made uneasy, something now emerges that can be named and that maintains that it means something in its tangibility. The autonomous subject has an impression, and can assert that it has been granted expressly to it.

4.

But how is the impression arrived at?

We are repeating ourselves. Or: we are repeated by the persistence of the question! And we find that the question is already illuminated by problematizing something that is addressed as an <idea> and trying to represent its process - something that we can replace with something that is seen as an impression. But how do we come to this replacement?

Gap

1.

We take the empirical method of creative practice as a welcome reason for a simple description that deliberately dramatizes a feature that is an interruption, a space, a blind spot, a transition.

We do not ever want to gloss over the difference between <something> that we ascribe to the sphere of power of poiesis and <something> that we fix in the outskirts of aesthesis, or to obliterate it by asserting the existence of an ontological unit, and so this intended representation definitely opens up a gap for us.

This seems to be limited, let us say: by resistance, a something from which everything emerges and that is left behind by the interventions and processes of the two powers in order to arrive at another something. Thus in this illustration the gap is doing nothing other than separating an a priori from an a posteriori.

2.

Idea? Impression? Expression?

Objectification? Embodiment? Visual event? Representation?

By asking how anything can come about at all, outside the essential gap, it is immaterial for the time being what we call, or mean by, <something>. <Something> is entirely adequate, as an open paradigm of a presence, a resistance. It is equally immaterial whether we start with poiesis or aesthesis, as we will arrive at the so-called gap in either case.

3.

For, having said that and as a result of that, we are starting from the gap, even though this - in contrast with something - actually evades concrete presentation. The spatial quality invoked is virtual in character; the outlines are ambiguous and the internal structure is undetermined within the hypothetical parameters. The admitted temporality is elastic in extent; duration and moment are uncertain, and within a beginning and an end the ability to be counted is of no significance. We are working on the basis that the gap exists, not least by naming it without saying what it is.

But because of this the gap itself, as ou-topos? as ou-chronos? - is not perceived as objectified or embodied. As an <authority> it fulfils the initial function of a problem field in our context. When represented it is a draft at first glance. It allows us to ask on the spot what is going on in between, between one something and another something, whose condition we have so preferred to differentiate by asserting a constant of being, a differentiation that is entirely based on accepting our gap.

4.

Thus we find ourselves in a state of emergency in terms of definition, and this is extremely important in terms of what we intend to do:

Because we are tempted to say something about the gap we could succumb to the justifiable impression that - once more - we were dealing with <something> that we could just as well call an idea. We have an idea, purely and simply, that we articulate and call: <gap>.

5.

Now in our illustration of creative practice we have never ceased to assert that the approximate nature or the rarity of this gap is - if at all - something, where <something> is subject to being completely questionable, and thus our idea of the gap as such is open to question as well. In the gap - as we have said - something happens that we present as a contrast to everything that we perceive or produce as <something>. And is thus quite simply the cause of the questionableness.

6.

It can be no surprise that idealistic checks and the aporias of epistemological confidence fail to an immeasurable extent at the moment when they are relativized by creative practice by passing repeatedly through the said gap. It is precisely the <empiricism of the moment> that shows that all assumptions are intentionally submitted to the perceiving authority for inspection in order to be either reconfirmed or indeed rejected as a poetic thesis in the transition to <something>, because the availability of the gap makes it possible to arrive at something else. The circularity of this process reinforces the practice of persistent scepticism in handling the gap.

7.

We can talk about a break in the process because the gap causes something to be missed and, in seizing the momentary withdrawal, justifies doubt. As our account shows, it is, shall we say: decompositional and recompositional processes that have their say in the gap.

But we can also speak of a break out from the process, as there is no nihilistic state of emergency hiding behind the apostrophized gap. Quite the contrary. The gap is a device. It seems to offer itself as a territory in which everything possible comes into play. An availability through which the radical virtualization of everything through which a something is tempted not to be a something any longer is carried too far in order to be content with something more definite. For the time being!

8.

The creating and perceiving subject seems to have share in and to take a share in this availability of perfect

virtualization in that by doing this it is not only itself affected by the decompositional and recompositional principles but can play on and instrumentalize these through its powers.

Thus the circumstantial evidence of the gap simultaneously allows us to subject the boundaries of all possibilities that are meant by <something>, and the boundaries of the powers to perceive or produce something, to thorough consideration.

What is meant when <something> remains when something fails to materialize? What is held on to without interruption when something drops out that is intended to be <something>? What do the form-giving and perceiving interventions ultimately intend? How far do they go? What is set in motion by the turbulence of the gap? What does it trigger off? What does it break up? And what finally stops us? Repetition?

9.

When in our illustration of creative practice it still seems not to matter what is meant by <something> in each case, in contrast with this it certainly does matter what is said about the gap. We have touched upon all sorts of things in our description in order to express conjectures. But partly we are talking about something, and at the same time have to assert that it is not possible to speak about it, at least not in that way, as language and presentation anticipate something that should not be said precisely like that, not said yet, or not said any more. Yes, we are tempted by our stated intention to keep hinting at or expressing something that is ultimately not meant. Precisely: something.

10.

This almost existential set of problems explains the scope and consequences of our intention. On the one hand we are addressing the paradoxical opportunity of getting away from the so-called description in all its forms; on the other hand all possible forms of description should be considered that are tempted to take up or exclude the discovered gap, to represent it or to replace it.

Something and something

1.

Our preceding description of creative practice makes it obvious how this is almost physically shaped by the direct presence of the gap. Indeed the creating and perceiving subject, by undertaking the interventions mentioned and being seized by the precarious processes, seems to experience the gap's insistence personally. At least the effects are completely familiar to the subject as experience and feeling.

2.

And theoretical discourse about creative practice now addresses this uninterruptedly. It refers to the gap, even if this is not named in every case or described as something different in each case. The discourse starts from something and comes back to something.

But it is not content with this; it does not for instance abandon the articulated and existing something. The something that arises is seen in context through the speculations of aesthesis and poesis and through the importunate nature of the questions. In the context of everything else, against the background of its possibilities. Not as articulation, and that's enough - no, as one possible articulation among others. In this way something that is <there> as a result of the creating and perceiving act, compared with <something> that is already there, in an exemplary manner, or with <something> that could be there instead of something that is there already. Thus creative practice and theoretical discourse seem unthinkable without something and something else, in the simultaneity of oscillation between possibilities.

3.

Incidentally, the articulation of the creative idea with its intention to make an effect and the impression of perception seldom turn out to coincide. It is rarely possible to identify unambiguously why one possible idea is preferred to another. This tension - and not least the tension between assertions of being by the poietic gesture and by aesthetic comprehension - obviously triggers theoretical discourse as poietic manifestation-forms that what has been produced takes back to the canon of involved interventions, raising the reduction in perception to the status of an object of detailed consideration.

4.

Therefore, in the reflections of the discursive element, something always appears as an incentive to virtualization in terms of what already exists and everything possible; here the theoretical gesture is tempted by the real boundary of a perfect something. Theoretical discourse about creative practice falls back on the gap as a poietic parallel, through the open possibilities of perception. It relates to the gap not just in speech, but through the poietic act of theorizing as speech - as the quintessential possibility of all reference.

5.

However tense the relationships between a creative practice and a theoretical discourse about it may remain, they are led to the common ground of an undivided view in an intervention: in differentiating. As a result they have the same goal in view.

Manifesting their traces is not intended simply and solely to confirm assertion of being of the thing that is ideally described as an artefact. The creative act has only partly to support the paradigm of what perception secretly expects. Something is added to everything that is already there; this something's independence as an assertion of being lies in the difference, its identity is again measured against everything that can also be possible. The creative something is therefore an interpretation in the actual sense of the word, leading simultaneously to repeated practice and continued theory.

For the creative act relates to a conceptual *donn_*, a definition of identity intended to give form to an assertion of identity by differentiating its articulation; it will then again be treated as a difference by the possibilities of perception and the perception of other possibilities. In a theoretical sense.

6.

The creative act and theoretical discourse fluctuate strikingly between something and something else. In relation to the availability of the above-mentioned gap. They partially neutralize the state of things, so that it can be established in another way by differentiation; they abandon the usual status of <something> in order to return to it under changed conditions. They touch on the undecidedness or simultaneity of identity and difference. With recourse to decompositional and recompositional processes and interventions.

They sum up the questionable nature of all assertions of being. Against the background of the gap. Their representations make the procedure of all perception into a problem, and, through the virtuality of perception, they do the same to the forms of all representation.

7.

Identity and difference? Identity or difference? Is that the question? Is that the constant, the undecided or changeable quality, upon which light falls in the gap?

How does it come to one and how to the other? How is a distinction reached?

What is there for example about the figure that represents an assertion of difference in contrast with the reason a posteriori in the transition to its perception, the so-called identity? The form? The substance? The content? The shape?

Does the difficulty lie for instance in an unduly hasty and flimsy congruency between the concept of identity and <something>, something or other that can be ascribed to so-called reality without it being possible to bring a manageable unit into play, an object that is tangible, for the difference? Can identity be shown in reality - and the difference only stated? Can what is said about the difference be shown as identity in reality?

Context

1.

We start with creative practice so that we can leave it behind. As a basis. The description allowed us to cast light on interventions and processes, dependencies and hypotheses as possibilities of representation, for which it is a striking example. The illustration is enough.

Creative practice is a possible articulation of something that in future is to be presented in a more fundamental context. As the epitome of context. Describing creative practice makes the abilities to differentiate, identify, produce and perceive into a figure that we will not replace with something else in what follows. Something is enough; we have shown it.

We intend to address the context to a certain extent as a whole, which we should like to link with <living, thinking and feeling>. And vice versa. We will examine the context that is brought into being by living, thinking and feeling. In all forms.

In this, we are not dealing with a <subject> in the usual way. Again the question remains of how a subject comes up in the first place. Practically and theoretically. How do living, thinking and feeling become a subject? In what context? When living, thinking and feeling articulate themselves and are articulated as something that we can describe more accurately as life-forms, thought-forms and feeling-forms. What forms allow themselves to live, think and feel? What life, what thought and what feeling allow themselves to be formed? In the context. With the gap.

2.

Against the background of the available gap we are now decidedly not asserting that we intend to do something definite with living, thinking and feeling. And we are not going to say what precisely we mean by form. Both borrowings are to be presented as questionable in the course of the analysis - and the way they are represented will be addressed as a problem. We are simply and solely falling back on the expressions here. We could just as well replace them with A and B if by that we mean the proverbial interdependence. And the characteristic of their differentness.

We do not take living, thinking and being for granted in their non-conceptual condition, or even as an ontologically irreversible phenomenon that hypostasizes something as <being> that can also be form: a possibility of perceiving living, thinking and being as such. As such? As a context!

We represent something through the said forms through which living, thinking and feeling impressively declare themselves, something that we perceive as a contrast with something else. And thus everything and nothing that rests on assertions of being and definitions in all their forms and is affected by the existential powers of poiesis and aesthesis.

But we do firmly assert that we take on thinking, living and feeling as articulated forms in contrast with other possible ones: in fact as representations of perceptual distinctions and as representative distinction of moments of perception.

3.

<Medium - a world in between>

This heading makes a statement. The poetic act fulfils the function of charging the context and the gap, inviting them to opt for sets of questions and certain analyses.

<Medium - a world in between> does not conclusively predetermine what is valid as the concept of medium, or is to be understood a priori. At the point of intersection between the two powers involved, the title allows the assumption that <something> is understood by it. Part of the starting position here is that obviously something is being stated that can be received, which leads to the temptation to want to or to have to understand something. What living, thinking and feeling can ultimately do with this is discussed as a way of handling things. Because although we do not decide on a theme we are obviously compelled to decide on something that can be used as a heading - and therefore to express this. In this form.

<Medium - a world in between> puts everything that can be represented at stake. And thus the open paradigm of problematic concepts like nature, culture, spirit, creativity, experience, insight, virtuality, reality, objectivity, subjectivity and other items that would have been adequate in some form or other as headings in order to break into the context through the relativizing gap.

4.

<Medium>: with this we address possibility. Possibility in all forms. Form as one possibility as opposed to another one. How do we arrive at possibility? How do we arrive at form as this possibility, as opposed to another one? That is more than enough - against the background of the established gap that puts the medium in a context: between the possibilities of conditions and the conditions of possibilities.

In Between

0. Prologue

0.1. Context

On the pages that follow we are drafting a context. This is presented as an arrangement in a particular form.

0.2. Mediatization, medialization,

medium

We intend to make a distinction between the authorities mediatization, medialization, medium and their conditioning by their arrangement, and to qualify them in their form.

0.3. Contingency, consistency,

coherence

In this way the contingency, consistency and coherence of what will be produced and perceived as assertions in all forms will appear in the full scope of their questionableness.

0.4. Existential processes

The existential abilities of perceiving and producing are part of this fundamental questionableness. In their postulated context. And in their forms of conventionalized and hypothetical representations.

0.5. Focuses

The named context goes back to existing representations. It starts from: something. It comes to: something. Thus the context comes into being in the

field of tension of possible implications and consequences.

0.6. Possibilities

The draft of the context reveals a dispositive of representations that is itself discussed both as a possibility of arrangement and also as a possibility of representation.

0.7. Representability

It is certain that representation is not itself sufficient as an arrangement in this form if the wide-ranging problem of all representability is not meant in each case. And indeed simultaneously. The theorem of incompleteness is valid.

0.8. Reciprocity

The context in the binding form of its present arrangement is only one thing. Other possibilities are not excluded. On the contrary. The dispositive offers the possibilities of representation. In all forms.

0.9. Comparison

The chosen representation does not replace any preceding ones. It is added on. Like other representations it does not stand for itself alone. It appears as a possibility of being tempted to representations in a particular form. Here the intentionality is less phenotypic than comparatistic.

0.10. Continuation

The representation of the context in its present form is not concluded, even when the arrangement is concerned with coherence and consistency.

The representation started a few years ago. It is a subsequent one among subsequent ones. And one among others, to which the context must again lead as a consequence.

1. The powers of aesthesis and poiesis

1.0. Prospects

We intend to examine aesthesis and poiesis to a certain extent in their <intransitive cause> as powers. Here we shall be abstracting experimentally from a <something>. The two powers are to be more closely defined with their diametrical spheres of influence and their interferential relativity and recorded, in the interplay of traditional senses, in their potential responsibility. As follows:

1.1. Aesthesis and poiesis

We start from two fundamental powers for which we use the traditional names aesthesis and poiesis. This is something that is of some use to us. We are a plausible example of it ourselves: we represent something that perceives and produces.

1.1.1. Linearization compels us to start somewhere; starting with the two powers is based on a representation decision.

1.1.2. When we say aesthesis we obviously also mean poiesis as well. The traditional name is already a trace of what perception leaves behind as perceived and expresses through a poetical act: a medium.

1.2. Interferential relativity

In this representation, aesthesis and poiesis appear in the uninterrupted to and fro of a relation. This tempts us to

anticipate the theorem of the interferential relativity of the two powers. Aesthesis and poiesis are thus interdependent.

1.3 Powers

The concept is a suggestion.

1.3.1. It is intended to imply predisposition, possibilities, indeed the cause of or quite simply the temptation to representation, in fact: a mode of responsibility.

1.3.2. In this way we encounter a methodological impasse that will recur and to which we shall repeatedly have to draw attention:

1.3.2.1. For example, we make a distinction between the so-called powers and a presumed <something> at which we arrive thanks to the powers.

1.3.2.2. Whatever we distinguish is always a consequence of applying the two powers, and is thus based on their responsibility.

1.3.2.3. Therefore we move simultaneously within a representation as possibility and an appeal to the possibilities of representation.

1.3.2.4. A distinction is made! Disjunction has a system. But why are some distinctions to be preferred to others.

1.3.2.5. By, for instance, placing the power as responsibility first, before a possible <something> we are going back to an existing heuristic difference between processuality and a state-form. This is already problematical because we are dealing with an established distinction based on an ontological axiom that is precisely what we do not mean here.

1.3.2.6. But what is meant are the methodological impasses within the representation as problems posed for representation as such. And in every case.

1.3.3. The concept of the power should allow us to discuss the possibilities and boundaries of all the competences of aesthesis and poiesis and to define these qualitatively and situatively.

1.3.4. In order to open aesthesis and poiesis up to a representation of their competences we have to contradict interferential relativity in the short term.

1.4. Differentiating the powers

What makes a distinction between poiesis and aesthesis is first of all nothing other than the application of disjunction. The resulting difference may lie in a different <directedness>. It can be a matter of orientation functions in or through space and time, in other words a dichotomization of processuality as such, which thus inclines to various representations.

1.4.1. Space and time? Aesthesis and poiesis, through the different tendentialities of their representation, tempt us to different forms of space and time, through which space and time are laid open to experience. As mediatized constellations.

1.4.2. And vice versa. Aesthesis and poiesis are probably forced to different representation by various forms of time and space.

1.5. Responsibilities

Aesthesis and poiesis can turn out to be syncretic or complex articulation of let us say: elemental valencies whose interplay determines the powers more closely.

1.5.1. By this we could understand <giving> and <taking>, for example, or <sending> and <receiving> in their cybernetic arrangement. Or as exemplary orientations: input and output.

1.5.2. Behind these correspondences is concealed the question of the availability of the powers and their cultural and anthropological limitations, in general and in particular.

1.5.3. Thus the tendentialization of processualities as such, and the prototypical arrangements that are applied through the application of disjunction are to be subject to detailed examination. How would it otherwise be possible for us to speak of a <to and fro> in terms of the two powers?

1.6.

Intransitive cause

In order to qualify the two powers in their competences they are to be addressed in their intransitive cause.

1.6.1. But at first everything seems to resist getting hold of aesthesis and poiesis without representation in some form being overtaken by what they produce and leave behind as powers, something that already corresponds to the trace of their processuality and thus is <something>, which is not to be talked about yet.

1.6.2.

Aesthesis and poiesis have to be addressed at a moment in between, in a condition or circumstance of their possibilities, where nothing that has been perceived or produced appears as a representation, in other words shortly before it comes to <something>.

1.6.3. The fact that <something> is always supposed to be there already is of no interest at this moment. We can - as an experiment - talk of <thinking it away>.

1.6.4. On the basis of our suppositions expressed under 1.4. and 1.5. we assume that aesthesis and poiesis move in different spaces of time and localities, which could also mean <parallel spheres>.

1.6.5.

From this we derive different forms of representation for aesthesis and poiesis. In both cases it comes to <something>, but what it comes to is based on whether and how the two powers, with their competences, are in play.

1.7 Constitutional diametry

Constitutional diametry describes the competences of the two powers with their areas of influence in time and place.

1.7.1. Constitutional diametry includes asymmetry and symmetry.

1.7.2. We imagine - entirely pictorially - territorial, in other words topical and chronic, spheres of influence, through whose arrangement aesthesis and poiesis appear in the difference of their virtual competences.

1.7.3. The possible spheres of influence of the two powers are seen as variable and dynamic.

1.7.4. We do not intend to decide for the

time being whether the areas of influence are open or closed.

1.7.5. We develop every conceivable form of possible interplay between the two spheres.

1.7.6. We are assuming points of contact or overlaps between spaces of time and locations - in other words visualized ideas that are kept for the one or the other area of influence.

1.7.7. That allows us to speak about congruencies or incompatibilities of aesthesis and poiesis.

1.7.8. The constellative configurations are perceived as stabilized or dynamic, which again influences forms of presentation.

1.8. Relation

With the theorem of interferential relativity we couple the tendency to mediate between the different areas of influence of aesthesis and poiesis in order to establish a relation <in some form> between their representations.

1.8.1. Thus the theorem of interferential relativity of the two powers and the theorem of diametry appear in an explicit relation.

1.8.2. <In some form> includes the possibility of an incongruency as relation.

1.8.3. Ideas of geometricization that incline to the arrangements of symmetry or asymmetry are part of the attempts at mediation.

1.8.3.1. Traditional imposition of symmetry requires detailed examination, for instance as <camouflage> of the constitutional diametry - or as a conventional concordance of aesthesis and poiesis.

1.9. Synaesthesia

We apply the theorems of diametry and of interferential relativity to the expansions and limitations of the so-called senses individually, and to their synaesthetic interdependencies.

1.9.1. We examine the status of the traditional senses, their representation, the imposition of aspects and hierarchies upon them, thus for example the prominence of individual senses as opposed to others.

1.9.2. In the course of this the dependencies between the qualifications of the individual senses are placed in context with interferential relativity.

1.9.3. Additionally, suggestions of representations are made for appropriate virtualities and valencies; possible syncretisms of individual senses with their corresponding areas of influence area also recorded.

1.9.4. <Interferential relativity> includes the presumed characteristic of the boundaries of the senses in detail. And possible transfer between the areas of influence of the senses in their possible interplay: as mediation.

19.5. Here the traditionally physical and

mechanical ideas are to be seen among the problems identified in 1.3.

1.10 Manifestations

Now we could assert for example that the interplay of interferential relativities and diametrical configurations are responsible for what can come to be represented at all as living, thinking and feeling, and how.

1.10.1. The participation of the competences, the areas of influence and possibilities of movement of the two powers in their appropriate qualification, determine living, thinking and feeling in their appropriate forms.

1.10.2. Thus we raise the fundamental question of how, where and when the powers of aesthesis and poiesis manifest themselves as representations of living, thinking and feeling. And under what conditions.

1.11. Organization

We call such representations in a certain form organizations.

1.11.1. Organization begins with a minimal arrangement of a diametrical configuration and an aspectualization of interferential relativity - and it leads to highly complex forms of possibly integration, confusion and association.

1.11.2. Of course the concept <organization> is to be regarded as already being a <medium>.

1.11.3. The characteristic of the relation in some form is the basis of this.

2. Mediatization

2.0. Prospects

We intend to use the concept of mediatization to define the emergence, stabilization and dynamization of what will later be addressed as a <medium>. Mediatization records the difference between supposed processes and corresponding state-forms. Through the measure of relation. The possibilities of interventions and transformations here instrumentalize the interferential relativity and the diametry of the two powers aesthesis and poiesis. Planes of organizations and constellations obviously create orientation in their mediatized form, through which it can come to <something>. As follows:

2.1. Aesthesis and poiesis

When using one possible representation of a process through which the authority of mediatization is to be qualified, we will not lose sight of aesthesis and poiesis and thus the theorems of interferential relativity and constitutive diametry.

2.2. Powers

The status of the traditional powers is addressed as such under points 1.3., 1.4. and 1.5. Should aesthesis and poiesis turn out to be syncretisms of complex processes, they will be subjected to decompositional and analytical consideration. That it comes to <something> is probably a result of the participation of canonical combinations of interventions and transformations.

2.3. Interactive responsibility

Our assumption is intensified on the basis of mediatization processes through which aesthesis and poiesis are determined in their interferential relativity and their diametrical constitution.

2.3.1. Whereby the reverse is entirely conceivable: the competences of aesthesis and poiesis cause the possibilities of the mediatization processes.

2.3.2. The authority of mediatization and the qualifications of the powers are to be seen constitutionally and situatively in the context.

2.4. Transitivity

The authority of mediatization completes the transition from an intransitive cause (1.6.) to transitivity in all forms. In this way the relation is established.

2.5 Interventions

At this point of transition a set of fundamental processes are involved that we group under the heading interventions. We open up a paradigm with the following hypotheses:

2.5.1.1. isolating versus integrating

2.5.1.2. making equal versus imposing a hierarchy

2.5.1.3. continuing versus interrupting

2.5.1.4. starting versus ending

2.5.1.5. analysing versus synthesizing

2.5.1.6. affirming versus negating

2.5.1.7. one statement versus repetition

2.5.1.8. sending versus receiving

2.5.1.9. giving direction rather than laying down

2.5.1.10. . . .

2.5.2. The examples of possible interventions listed above mark the start of a necessary representation of a process through which mediatization involves itself in <something> coming into being.

2.5.3. We assume that mediatization interventions create conditions under which processes and appropriate state-forms can be differentiated.

2.5.4. Even if the inventory of possible interventions should turn out to be existentially constant, we do not at the same time hereby prehypostasize the finite nature of possible state-forms.

2.6. Relations

The relation appears as a manifest articulation through the intervention of mediatization.

2.6.1. Mediatization instrumentalizes relations between processes and state-forms, between processes and processes, between state-forms and state-forms.

2.6.2. We are obviously in a position to recognize mediatized state-forms as perceived or produced, as opposed to the appropriate powers of perceiving and producing as such, and also to name them and to distinguish them from each other. Distinctions are recognized and established in our representation on the basis of interventions.

2.6.3. Equally, our conjectures that establish a relation between <something> that can be called perceivable and <something> that can be called produced, seem to be based on the use of interventions.

2.6.4. If we repeatedly observe that we think we are perceiving <something> without being able to say what it is - if we are at all in the position of producing <something> that does not exist in the face of our power of perception - if we believe that we are perceiving something where apparently there is nothing - if we are able to perceive <nothing> where ostensibly there should be <something>, then the failure lies in the momentary or fundamental unavailability of a relation that is brought into position by an intervention.

2.6.5. The <something> that we still mean at this point is something that, by agreement, causes a <something> that is to be ascribed to the field of influence of aesthesis and a <something> that is to be ascribed to the field of influence of poiesis to appear as a relation. Through the mediatized state-form. As an event of interferential relativity. As a diametrical constellation. On the basis of the participating interventions. As: medium.

2.6.6. Even when this <something> is isolated as a so-called stimulus intended to impact on photoreceptors, mechanoreceptors or chemoreceptors a relation - addressed or not - is already assumed that localizes the perceptible <something> by means of a mediatization intervention and, by means of a further intervention, transforms it into something that is said to have been produced as perceived.

2.7. Condition
Mediatization makes the relation a condition.

2.7.1 If we believe that aesthesis and poiesis are under pressure to a certain extent because of their predisposition to <something>, then, under the authority of mediatization, we are imagining a dispositive of conditions under which it is generally possible that <something> will come about.

2.7.1.1. We can illustrate it like this: the gap in which <something> hypothetically comes about is based on the conditions laid down within the dispositive of mediatization.

2.7.2. Therefore the relation and the conditions are to be examined under the authority of mediatization.

2.8. Arrangement
We now assume that the possibilities of intervention do not establish the relation in the simple form of organizations only: their repeated application brings arrangement types, and therefore organization levels, into being to which a degree of complexity applies.

2.8.1. The concept of repetition marks the recreation of links between mediatized arrangements and the conditions of possibilities that lead to something.

2.8.2. Behind all the conceivable possibilities of this representation of planes or complexities is concealed the fundamental question of the structured nature of a system in general.

2.8.3. We are thus addressing the conditions of a system and the essentially systematic nature of conditions and possibilities.

2.8.4. We suggest that complex contexts of mediatized organizations should be called constellations.

2.8.5 The world-moving contexts, repeatedly indicated here, <living, thinking and feeling> are to be treated as constellations. As articulations of medialized conditions and relations

2.9. Stabilization and dynamization
We assert that organizations in the simple form of their manifest relations and constellations come into being in the complex arrangement of organizations by being stabilized or dynamized as a context.

2.9.1. Here we are probably dealing with prototypical interventions, or even with conditioning the interventions in general.

2.9.2. Stabilization and dynamization
modalize the powers of aesthesis and poiesis, interferential relativity and constitutional diametry.

2.9.2.1. Thus for instance the customary organization of seeing an impression as an expression is a form of stabilization, and therefore an instrumentalization of interferential relativity.

2.10. Conditions of the relation
Types of relation arising from the possibilities of the conditions are to be anticipated within constellations and organizations in the context of the possible interventions.

2.10.1. Here we assume that the interventions of stabilization and dynamization primarily affect the relation and thus set forms of relations.

2.10.2. Forms of relations, their conditions and their systematization are to be discussed under the authority of mediatization. They lead to certain arrangements as opposed to others on the basis of which it comes to <something>.

2.10.3. This includes, for example, the paradigm of supposedly scientific axioms and postulates.

2.10.3.1. Which - among other things - means: space and time in their form as mediatized conditions and representations, which influence the interventions and relations as constellations.

2.10.4. What is meant are relation types intended by the dispositive, including subject-object predications and logical-causal determinations.

2.10.4.1. This includes all possibilities of ?aktantial occupations.

2.10.5. And more: interdependencies of stabilized state-forms, and of state-forms that can be dynamized, are to be considered under the conditions of relations whenever these interdependencies are the basis on which taxonomy and taximony, position, function, value and meaning establish that the arrangement can be declared coherent.

2.10.5.1. Thus categories and dichotomies - not least the customary ones - as mediatized functions are meant as forms of coherence.

2.10.6. Certainly what is called available and existent is to be considered here, in other words direct confrontation with constellations and organizations as mediatized present or presence.

2.10.6.1.

Aesthesis and poiesis, in their competence, see themselves confronted with <something> that is not just simply and solely perceived here and now, but integrated as something that has already been produced.

2.10.6.2. As a result of this, what is produced and what is perceived, as mediatized constellations, restrict the possibilities of intervention.

2.10.6.3. Such restrictions are based on recurrence and reference within mediatized constellations and organizations.

2.10.6.4. Constellations that have already been perceived and produced, with their organizations, present themselves to perception as mediatized orientation systems that are considered given, and to which recourse is had with all the virtualities of stabilization and dynamization.

2.11. Consistency

The interventions of stabilization and dynamization raise the question of the consistency of mediatized state-forms.

2.11.1. This question is posed on all levels. It applies both to the constellation in its complexity and also the organization in its simple form of relation.

2.11.2. Consistency is based on the nuance of the difference, which permits us to distinguish state-forms from processes.

2.11.3. Decisions that have already been formulated are part of the constellation as mediatized stabilizations and influence the virtualities of further interventions.

2.11.3.1. Within these stabilized arrangements we include those that are called material as opposed to immaterial organizations and constellations.

2.11.4. Nature, culture, reality, for example are among the conditions under which it can come to <something> at all, as mediatized constellations in their appropriate consistency and specific arrangement. The ominous spirit. And not least language. They, as exemplary contexts, determine the form of the relation as a conditioning of aesthesis and poiesis. As a dispositive, within which <something> has to take shape.

2.11.5. By <form> a status is meant that appears as relation in a certain consistency through the conditions of mediatization. The consistency of the medium.

3. Medialization

3.0. Prospects

We intend to cast light on directness and differentiability under the authority of medialization. And indeed as constants of an interim quality through which relationality is laid down as a categorical tendency to relation.

Thus we postulate an availability that reserves perfect indifference for itself. As follows:

3.1. Direct differentiability

The authority of medialization maintains the continuity of the possibility of discontinuity and disjunction. Thus we posit the constant of direct differentiability.

3.1.1. With our intention of producing

<something> we are already resorting to arrangements of mediatization that are inconceivable without a space-time dispositive and a paradigm of conditions.

3.1.2. Here we take our bearings from the event of perception: before it can come to <something> at all, a point of view in relation to a field of intervention is isolated and determined, for example, by adjusting the focus. This disposition repeats itself in the familiar distinction of <figure> and <ground>.

3.1.3. It is first of all completely unimportant what is gained as figure or ground. But it is certainly less unimportant that it comes to this predisposition at all, within which the interventions treated under mediatization and the instrumentalization of aesthesis and poiesis take effect.

3.1.4. But what happens through the repeated <empiricism of the moment> - regardless of all mediatization - through perception or to perception is the according of a difference.

3.1.5. This difference appears for example in the first sentence, where it obviously silently allows us even to distinguish between aesthesis and poiesis.

3.1.6. Within our representation we repeatedly have recourse to the intervention of disjunction. To this end we are playing on the difference. On the plane of mediatization. With reference to the availability of medialization.

3.1.7. The intervention of <differentiating> seems to belong not just to the possibilities of mediatization, in that it makes it possible to problematize the conditions and the relativity of the relation.

3.1.8. The intervention of differentiating can interrupt the course of the representation and the aspectualization of the accompanying processes at any point at all, in that an adjustment of focus and an initial dispositive repeatedly have to be designed in order to make aesthesis and poiesis able to be instrumented. At the same time we can play with deliberate lack of focus at any time, which will blur the mediatized conditions of a figure on its ground and therefore the form of the relation.

3.2 Interim quality and relationality

We discuss the theorem of latent interim quality, which we link with the theorem of categorical relationality under the authority of categorical relationality.

3.2.1. By interim quality we mean that gap in which the relation can occur as a possibility.

3.2.2. By relationality we mean the tendency of the interim quality to be limited by mediatized state-forms.

3.2.3. Against this background, differentiability generates the open paradigm of possible dichotomies that are represented by the disposedness of the interim quality with simultaneous disposedness of relationality.

3.2.4. And here the manifest relation is a form of this relationality and is instrumentalized by the interventions and conditions of mediatization.

3.2.5. Equally, the manifest difference is a form of differentiability.

3.2.6. We postulate the simultaneity of differentiability and relationality under the authority of medialization.

3.3. Medialization and mediatization
Medialization and mediatization are interdependent. We propose to apply the concept of interferential relativity on this plane.

3.3.1. The status of medialization and mediatization are to be discussed under the concept of interferential relativity, and thus the interdependence of the possibilities and of the conditions.

3.3.1.1. For example, we have to ask to what extent attempts to define a <depth structure> are compatible with possible qualifications of medialization - and how transitions to an articulated <surface structure>, for example, correspond with the interventions and conditions of mediatization.

3.3.1.2. The radicalized decompositional and analytical disentanglement of all systems that intend to find the framework of a <pure> syntax certainly show us that the authority of medialization - if at all - can mean only the virtualities of a syntax but not its structured quality, because this already fulfils the constellation of mediatization as a representation.

3.3.1.3. The measures of so-called logic are to be seen with similar reservations: they do definitely reveal the possibilities of intervention possibilities and consistently use differentiation, but this is so that by so-called thinking, or while thinking, they can stabilize arrangements that a mediatized system marks with coherent relations.

3.4. Complete availability
We suggest that complete availability be accorded to the authority of medialization.

3.4.1. Complete availability means that our spatial and temporal ideas are already constellations in a mediatized form; they are intended by the availability of medialization, but do not represent it themselves.

3.4.2. This incompatibility supposedly applies to every system that cannot at the same time represent how it represents itself.

3.4.2.1. But in saying this we are by no means asserting that the system concept and its conditions are applicable to medialization.

3.4.2.2. Medialization admits representations that can be called systems as forms of mediatization. In their coherence. And in their consistency.

3.4.3. Availability includes the ability to be represented and its possibilities, without itself succumbing to the conditions of a representation. It therefore makes the current representation possible in its mediatized constellation, for which it holds the unimaginable range of all possibilities of an arrangement in readiness.

3.4.4. Therefore medialization designs something that reveals itself only in terms of something different and on the basis of the interim quality and relationality of the perception, in other words always maintaining a possible difference from our representation.

3.4.5. We are inclined to define the complete availability of differentiability and relationality as the possibility of possibilities, indeed as a possibility of making the conditions a condition. Through the authority of medialization. In the context of mediatization.

3.4.5.1. Given the uninterruptedly present sense of this availability we consider the suspicion justified that impasses in qualifying the authority of medialization are caused by the fact that the organizations and stabilized constellations made available to us by mediatization place a taboo on medialization.

3.4.5.2. The reason is perhaps that the conditions of mediatization cannot be maintained on the plane of medialization.

3.4.5.3. Thus the conditions of interim quality and relationality do lay claim to the arrangement of a representation, but it is not yet a form.

3.4.6. Although we assert that the authority of medialization exists, we do not thereby presuppose that it <is>.

3.4.6.1. We are starting to identify medialization when we represent the powers in their interferential relativity, and the authority of mediatization with its possibilities of interventions and its conditioning of the relations.

3.4.6.2. At the same time medialization seems to sum up the questionable nature of representability. By the continuity of its ability to be repeated. It maintains the missing argument. By the insistence of the interim quality.

3.5 Indifference

We complement complete availability with the theorem of absolute indifference.

3.5.1. We continue to assert that a representation of <something> is arrived at in some form on the basis of the complete availability of an interim quality and its relationality. In what form seems to be a matter of complete indifference.

3.5.2. It is the interventions of the powers and the conditions of mediatization that confront this indifference. By articulating a possible difference.

3.5.3. Conjectures about chance or necessity arise through the insistence of medialization in interplay with mediatization.

3.5.4. The principle of an omnipresent temptation justifies the permanence of indifference and the intendment of possibilities.

3.4.5.1. The possibilities of medialization mean that the powers are constantly tempted to see <something> in its mediatized organization as <something different>, to replace <something> with <something else>, suddenly to see <something> differently and to produce <something> else. One possibility among others. A medium.

4. Medium

4.0. Prospects:

At last we are getting there. But only for the time being. We describe the medium as a possibility among a range of possibilities. By possibility we understand nothing other than the event of representability which is conclusively reached on the basis of our previous attempts at representation. As follows:

4.1. What is a medium?

Minds must divide in the face of the possible answers. As a result of the precariousness that the medium makes obvious.

4.2. Circumstantial evidence

The medium is a locus communis of a summary on the basis of our preceding representation. We find that:

4.2.1. The medium is that condition for which aesthesis and poiesis can be declared to be competent.

4.2.1.1. Everything we can assert to be perceived, everything we can assert to be produced, is a medium.

4.2.1.2. Everything we can say cannot be perceived, everything we can say cannot be produced, is a medium.

4.2.1.3. The medium causes interferential relativity and constitutional diametry to come into play.

4.2.1.4. The medium is that thing that is arrived at on the basis of an interferential relativity.

4.2.1.5. The medium is a diametrical constitution.

4.2.2. The medium is that state-form that opens up through the interventions of the mediatization of a representation.

4.2.2.1. The medium fulfils the condition.

4.2.2.2. The medium is the imagining of the relation.

4.2.2.3. The medium is the event of a coherence of stabilization and dynamization.

4.2.2.4. The medium is the articulation of its consistency.

4.2.3. The medium is the representation of a possibility that uninterruptedly refers to the intendence of medialization.

4.2.3.1. The medium is the representation of a relation that is a possibility only when seen against the background of the interim quality.

4.2.3.2. The medium is the representation of a difference that is a possibility only on the basis of complete availability.

4.2.3.3. The medium is the representation of a form that is a possibility only on the basis of absolute indifference.

4.2.3.4. The medium is the representation of a decision that is a possibility only in the transition from its undecidedness to its decidability.

4.2.3.5. The medium is the omnipresent temptation to be replaced by something else.

4.3. <Is?>

Thus the medium is the time and place at which something is mediated.

4.3.1. The mediation of a complete relation is a temptation to assert an identity.

4.3.2. Nevertheless we cannot say what a medium <is>.

4.3.2.1. We can only repeat that a medium is a relation of <something> and <something>.

4.3.2.2. What, please?

We could for example suggest that its so-called identity is based on the relation of two entities.

4.3.2.3. Come now! But what are identities in contrast with entities? Media! And thus possibilities of representation that on the basis of a differentiation correspond with an assertion of identity that fulfil the conditions of the relation.

4.3.3. By categorically maintaining the condition of the relation we can rely only on the following axiom: one possibility always remains. Among others.

4.3.4. The concept ÒmediumÓ is a working

identity and a representation decision.

4.3.5. The possibility as initial unit is thus excluded from our possibilities of representation.

4.3.5.1. The impossibility of being open to representation relates to the possibility of preferring the possibility to a possibility.

4.4. Fatality of possibility

The temptation to stabilize the duality of the relations and the plurality of the possibilities of the conditions through the very condition of possibility produces the systematic claim of a validity.

4.4.1 Thus, for example, that which applies to the powers and interventions for sound-formation, which are given phonemes as mediatization constants, should also apply to the content substance as universals.

4.4.2. This desire dictates, for example, the ideas of an ontology that intends to create a fundamental arrangement for the conditions of the possibilities with an identified entity of being.

4.4.3. In appropriate amplification, the efforts of metaphysics, with its express ideal of transcendence, are committed to a finalization that causes the continuity of relationality, availability and indifference to be removed in a finite courtly love of all differences through which the medium is relieved of the precariousness of its mediation, thus to a certain extent overcoming the conditions of the medium.

4.4.4. We assert that forms of representation that as a relational sign structure indicate an external reference perhaps intended to be something other than another medium, are a substitute for ontological underpinning and metaphysical equipment.

4.4.5. The attempt to counter the continuity of differentiability and relationality with causality is obviously undertaken by structuring the traditional forms of stabilization.

4.4.5.1. The mediatized constellation of time means that a beginning and an end are envisaged that, as possibility, justify those that follow, or direct those that precede towards a final one.

4.4.5.2. The idea of an initial or a terminal intervention is obvious as a result of this temptation to mediatized forms of representation.

4.4.5.3. And thus for instance the mythologeme of an initiator-subject that certainly does nothing other than to illustrate the fatality of the possibility, dramatically and epically: does <it> begin with aesthesis or poesis? How do we arrive at something other than a medium? Does the execution of an initiating difference remove indifference in the actual sense?

4.4.4.6. We have certainly also allowed ourselves to be carried away to the extent of calling differentiability the possibility of possibilities under 3.4.5. And thus succumbed to a conclusive form of representation.

4.4.6.1. The temptation lies in the transition from dynamic lack of definition to stabilizing a definition.

4.4.6.2. This transition is to be made accessible to the moment. And discussed extensively. On all planes. Within the organizations and constellations of media.

4.4.6. The approach of speaking under the constitutive diametry of geometricization turns out to be justified. As one of the fatalities of the possibility.

4.4.6.1. The forms of temptation that have

been represented and discussed are shaped by a <triadic> arrangement of mediatization.

4.4.6.2. On the other hand we maintain, for instance, the axiom of perfect parallels without the optimism of a possible intersection point.

4.5. Medium and powers:
The medium is a paradox.

4.5.1. The medium faces the powers and the instrumentalization of the interventions with the representation of a complete fact. Through the authority of mediatization.

4.5.2. The medium faces the powers and the sequence of interventions with the precariousness of the one possibility. Through the authority of mediatization.

4.5.3. The interferential relativities of mediatization and medialization allow medium, organization and constellation to be distinguished from each other and to be qualified. Through their possibilities of definite conditions and through the conditions of definite possibilities.

4.5.4. Representing our dispositive addresses a typology of media. By this we mean interplay between possibilities and conditions.

4.5.4.1. The rules for a typology of this kind are to be considered as given within our mediatized system, through the terminological intentionality and the structured quality of the interdependencies named. We reserve the right to make exceptions.

4.5.4.2. For instance, this arrangement is intended to make it possible to speak of the degree of productivity and reproductivity of media, which for their part produce media.

4.5.4.3. This arrangement can make it possible to describe the competences of media to perceive other media in a definite form.

4.5.4.4. From this, similarity and alternancy are aspectualized as interference between an assertion of identity and the application of a difference.

4.6. Subject and autonomy

The assertion of identity of a so-called autonomous subject as a type of a medium is explained by the representation of its involvement in mediatization and medialization, which distinguish its interferential relativities and the powers to perceive and produce representations. As further media in their organization and constellation.

4.6.1. Now however the autonomy that is being addressed remains within severe bounds. Through the condition of relation.

4.6.2. If <something> is intended to mean the type of a medium that can be perceived only in its interferential relativity and becomes the cause of producing <something>, then <someone> can mean the type of a medium who perceives the cause of producing <something>.

4.6.2.1. In every case medium means <something> and <something>. In our representation. Therefore the sentence in the usual form of its mediatization also applies to <someone> and <someone>.

4.6.3. The visible excitement and uninterrupted efforts to make an assertion of identity absolute are analogous with acceptance of autonomy by a producing and perceiving subject.

4.6.3.1. Looking for so-called <common sense> outside the relation and localizing it in <something or other> derives from the subject-concept's claim to autonomy.

4.6.4. The subject-concept itself, in its traditional assertion of identity, is to be doubled. As a condition. <Common sense> is an interference of <someone and someone>. Through <something and something>. As an organization.

4.6.4.1. <We> as a medium are a representation of the coherence of this doubling in its mediatized consistency.

4.7. State

Here we can represent medialization, mediatization and medium, the possibilities of intervention and conditions, the coherence and consistency of media, the powers of aesthesis and poiesis as a possibility of a context, and in its questionableness, only by using media. As part of our availability to their organization and constellation.

4.7.1. <Our availability> is the sign of the border.

4.7.2. In doing this we are representing even the type of a medium in its complex constellation of majority organizations. As a medium, on the basis of our powers and interventions, which we make the cause of a mediatization, we are involved in the emergence of further media at every moment.

4.7.3. We obviously allow ourselves to be tempted to produce other media by media that are already present and stabilized in their specific connotations. Media that, through our interventions, are once more stabilized in their form, or in another form of the relation. By an intentional dynamization.

4.7.4. We are ourselves stabilized or dynamized as a constellation when this happens. In some form or another.

4.7.4.1. Active and passive are a transient phenomenon of mediatization. And qualify the medium in its relation to other media.

4.7.5. We are certainly uninterruptedly subject to interferential relativity on all levels.

4.7.6. We accept this condition. We recognize the condition. As a situation.

4.7.6.1. The situation explains the absolute necessity of relying on other media.

4.7.6.2. This reliance tempts us to perceive and produce something by relating to other media.

4.7.6.3. At the same time the necessity arises from the temporary nature of all represented assertions of identity by the medium, as interference of the instances of mediatization and medialization.

4.7.7. The express necessity makes communication possible. And vice versa: the possibility make communication a condition.

4.7.7.1. Communication is the temptation of the medium by its assertion of identity - in contrast with other media.

4.7.7.2. Communication is the temptation of the medium to be determined by others.

4.7.7.3. Communication is the temptation of the medium to assert its autonomy through the manifestation of difference.

4.7.7.4. Our representation is a form of communication.

4.7.8. Communication is a form of repetition.

4.8. Repetition

Once is no times. We are and remain since our stated intention, which has led is to the preceding statements, reliant on repetition. At every moment of our representation.

4.8.1. We have already discussed the customary quality of geometrical underpinning and equivalents under constitutive diametry.

4.8.1.1. We also insist at this point on our reservation in terms of arithmetical applications.

4.8.1.2. If <two-ness>, for example, ceaselessly dominates us and our representation we are here necessarily succumbing to an order that shapes repetition through the <natural number>.

4.8.1.3. We discuss this arrangement as a possibility - and repeat that we include the conditions of ability to be represented as an extensive set of problems.

4.8.2. We perceive and produce: media. We perceive and produce: us. A medium. With every word of our representation. And thus the situation turns out to be strikingly simple.

4.8.3. This presentation is already a repetition of what we pretend to perceive and obviously produce. Media through media, media to media. Thus the situation appears to be increasingly and inexhaustibly complex.

4.8.4. Although the situation as such has to be accepted, it will obviously not be taken as such in every case.

4.8.5. Accepting the situation and at the same time not purely and simply taking it as such we should like to call handling. ?Therewith.

4.8.5.1. The situation is simple only if it is merely taken as such.

4.8.5.2. That the situation is not just merely taken as such shows our complex representation under its decimal nomenclature.

4.8.5.3. Simplicity or complexity are possibilities in handling the conditions of the situation.

4.8.6. As the situation is not taken as such, it repeats itself as such.

4.8.6.1. We perceive and produce: media.

4.8.6.2. We perceive that we perceive, we perceive that we produce: mediatizations.

4.8.6.3. We perceive what we think we perceive; we perceive what we assert we produce: media.

4.8.6.4. We produce what we intend to produce: media.

4.8.6.5. And so on.

4.8.7. Repetition permits the application of the difference in handling the situation.

4.8.7.1. Difference or identity are the characteristic of the repetition on the basis of dynamizing or stabilizing interventions.

4.8.8. Repetition is a form of coherence. Or conversely: the situation is taken as such through the form of coherence.

4.8.9. Repetition opens up the possibilities of

the standpoint within the relation and to the relations.

4.8.10. Repetition is based on the availabilities of the authorities of mediatization and medialization.

4.8.11. The medium is the reference of this availability. As repetition.

4.9. Entropy
The situation tempts us to be simple or to be complicated. As handling forms.

4.9.1. We assert that simplicity is the result of the entropy of mediatization and medialization. In its availability.

4.9.1.1. Entropy causes the acceptance of a unit as a form of simplicity. Thus the situation is taken as such.

4.9.1.2. The attempt to represent mediatization and medialization is a form of complexity. Thus the situation is not taken as such.

4.9.1.3 The temptation to completeness, totality or conclusion of a representation is measured by its degree of entropy. Thus the situation is again taken as such.

4.10 Imposing directness
Directness is repetition of the temptation not to take the situation as such.

4.10.1. <Directness> is not a medium.

4.10.2. Directness shakes entropy.

4.10.3. Directness is based on a momentary or categorical non-availability.

4.10.3.1. Directness puts the relation at risk.

4.10.3.2. Directness is the repetition of difference. To our representation. Thus the situation is not taken as such.

4.10.4. Directness brings up the question of the reversibility and irreversibility of everything that comes to be represented. By repeating mediatization and medialization. With their possibilities and conditions. By repeating interventions. Through the interferential relativities of the two powers of aesthesis and poiesis.

4.10.5. Now we should be tempted not to take the situation as such, to repeat ourselves and to start at the beginning. Under the conditions represented. As a possibility of representation. In another form.

An opening as finale

1. Relativizing and reflecting

1.1. Picture

The two gestures have become the accepted thing. And history. Post-history, post-war history. They tangibly shape our living, thinking and feeling; they go hand in hand, effortlessly taken for granted in handling the situation, its conditions and possibilities. We live, think and feel - and precisely in doing that we do not purely and simply accept what should be understood as living, thinking and feeling. Publicly or privately. As mediatized requirements and with their interferential relativities. In their precarious balance of interventions that have already been stabilized and dynamizations that are still

possible. As media.

They reflect the undecided state-form for which the concept <culture> is used. In the context of processes and assertions of being for which the concept of <nature> has been pleaded as an excuse. In their contradictory articulations, for which an autonomous subject is asserted that claims to create its so-called life in its form, through the possibilities of thinking and feeling. And thus in its turn to discover what is meant by culture and by nature. And what is meant by itself.

1.2. Legend

And so we are ultimately forced to plan to do something and not simply and solely to take the situation as such. By and large; in a small and modest way. In the form of the situation's representations, that design and claim contexts as culture or nature. By this we are tempted to reflect about the situation and the way in which it is handled and to relativize the possible representations in all their forms, by subjecting the very conditions and possibilities of representation to deliberate consideration. Using everything that we shall from now on examine as media. In their precariousness.

Our previous representation opens up the possibility of not just exposing them to the standpoint of the other, extending and relativizing them by various forms of continuation. It designs a field of play on which different ideas can be represented in their different consistency, in order to examine the disposition of the manifest conditions of that consistency, to compare them with each other in their express coherence and to illuminate possible assertions of interference in applications and consequences. The act of repeatedly relativizing perception is ready to put its conditionality at stake simultaneously, but often causes a mood of extreme seriousness to cast a cloud over unconditional handling, through the completed act of representation itself. Open and closed forms of representation seem to restrict the situation in a particular way, indeed every representation decides conclusively in favour of some possibilities as opposed to others. This explains the aggressive offensive breadth of our undertaking, which has only just begun.

2. Fracture and fluidity

2.1. Picture

The accepted behaviour of relativizing and reflecting has rarely been used so intensively, or so expressly emphasized in its demonstration. It shapes representations in all their forms. This produces other arrangements of interferential relativity. Dynamizations utilize their rights within the mediatized constellations as a matter of principle; the conditions of possible relations are negotiated at all levels. The state of things can be relativized in a moment if it is simultaneously reflected upon. Thus <something> does not last for very long; something else is on the spot immediately. Purely and simply. Substitution is a tried and tested resource. The possible variant is obvious. Metaphors offer themselves and are substituted. The consistency and coherence of what is momentarily present, and exists, make less impression. Surprising formations of paradigms link contexts that opt for the interplay of disintegrating and reintegrating interventions, and easily overplay the conditions of ostensible integrity of previous contexts and references.

The interventions and interferences of aesthesis and poiesis are revealed on the spot as a result of the emphasized moment of reflection. They determine the expression: possible statements about <something> aspectualizes the relation with a simultaneous insight <about> how this <something> is arrived at. Here and now. Foresight and hindsight come into play. The sell-by date is on the packaging. The expressed conditions always measure themselves against further possibilities. Recognizing the conditions is part of the ambience. Flexible subjectivity and other omens endow the representations with the characteristic of being provisional.

In this and other ways, the means of handling that plumb and explore the authorities of mediatization, medialization and the paradoxes of the medium as representations and exhibitions gain a foothold. Here recourse to the above-mentioned gap emerges as a possibility of

addressing, from a pleasurable and a critical distance, <everything> that pretends to be <something> and to mean <something>. Through the reflecting trait.

2.2. Legend

Now, by reflecting about and relativizing the legendary behaviour itself, we are playing with the intended suspicion that this will mean that the situation is purely and simply taken as such, as the variability and availability of the possibilities can distract from the conditions of the stabilized arrangements and the stabilized interventions about which we are precisely not reflecting.

We intend as an experiment to exaggerate the gestures of relativizing and reflecting as far as we possibly can. We will adopt the current concepts as a possibility, but without being able to assess in advance what conditions are simultaneously concealed behind them. And what experiential boundaries are imposed on living, thinking and feeling. Our representation brings up questions about measures for stabilizing and dynamizing media and medial constellations in the broadest sense. Questions which confront so-called culture with so-called nature. And vice versa. In the attempt to institutionalize forms of the relation between the authorities of mediatization and medialization, so that they can be handled <naturally>.

3. Zeitgeist and condition

3.1. Picture

This pointed representation of our state of mind and of our starting-point arises from a considered element of perception that is concerned with the increasing availability of media and with the forms of this availability, which record and relativize everything that we still call living, thinking and feeling. This availability of certain possibilities, and the conditions of these possibilities, are reflected by the supposedly new channels and media and sharply intensified when presented visually. Repetition has a system. That is how it looks. And conversely: mediatized communication systems illustrate repetition in all its forms. As an arrangement that initiates and imitates the interventions. They bring dynamization into play. On all levels and in every programme. And they sum up stabilization - a crystalline light-source against the background of a user-surface.

Relations within minimal organizations, constellative oscillation between the acceptance of mediatized conditions and medialized relativizations repeatedly see themselves cleared up situatively. In daily and momentary handling. They create a problem for the interferential relativities and the constitutional diametry of the powers almost uninterruptedly, and these are simultaneously encroached upon in their competence by the reflection factor. As a result the interventions that affect the relation, that make it intermittent, reconstitute and consolidate it to establish the actual tempo, coagulate when handling the situation. They leave marks on intentionality. They determine the measures of the representation. They make the questionable nature of representability obvious. The changing settings now hold back somewhere in between, focal points - undecided between accepted possibilities and provisional conditions in the to and fro of the interferential relativities between aesthesis and poesis.

3.2. Legend

We consider it desirable to make exemplary characterizations of situation and handling through the differences in their possibilities and conditions under the concept of availability, and to concretize them as implementations of our undertaking. Thus apparently places and times will not only be repeatedly represented in their availability, but time and place will be themselves be addressed in detail as forms of this availability. In the context of the two powers of aesthesis and poesis and the interplay of interventions. In comparison with media that have the powers at their disposal as aspectualization of constitutional diametry in a certain interferential relativity, so that in turn they can have media at their disposal. Intentional and extensional predications of

mediatization and medialization will thus be examined, as they obviously stipulate the possibilities of availability or non-availability and determine the competences of the two powers. Not least in terms of what they are prepared to accept as living, thinking and feeling in order to be able to start from <something>, insist on <something> and understand <something> that can be relativized in repetition at any time.

Nostalgia and utopia

4.1. Picture

Epochs, the degree of consistency and the claim to coherence of the factor intended to give appropriate content to the concept of culture, are distinguished by different ways of handling the situation. Instrumentalization of the powers, and the imposition of hierarchy on the interferential relativity of mediatization and medialization, mean that either state-forms or processes are elevated to be the prime object of their representation.

Thus approaches to handling the representation of the situation tend to shift their attention to the consolidated nature of mediatized organizations and constellations, to the complete achievement of supposedly constant facts. Others are inclined to distance themselves from an ostensibly perfect balance between mediatization and medialization and to set the dominant entropy of recurrence and reference in motion. Here the interferential systematizations of living, thinking and feeling and of culture and nature should turn out to be a paradoxical simultaneity of repeated attempts to handle this. After the paradoxical nature of this simultaneity of possibilities and conditions, of state-forms and processualities, once more refuses to accept representability, the representations convey all forms of the temptation to be relativized with time. Here reflecting and relativizing seem to be the appropriate reactive mode for evading the constant crux of emerging paradoxes.

Our current picture of childhood, for example, embodies a categorical flexibility in the practically unlimited testing of possible interventions, and theoretically embodies the claim to autonomy through the momentary availability of medialization in its tempting quality through difference and indifference. Even the phase of childhood is determined to a certain extent by not taking the situation as such and relativizing the given systematizations of all mediatizations, in order to be an example of an ideal-typical individualization of interferences and relations. In the reflecting production of momentary possibilities and conditions. Here the <power of decision> between supposed overview and situative insight is elevated to be the actual precursor of an intentional meta-discourse, playing possibilities and conditions off against each other and making judgements.

4.2. Legend

We are doing nothing different! We hold to our intention of not accepting stabilized conditions in all their forms and relying on the complete availability of medialization. But this is not associated with the utopia of achieving a different state-form through initiated processes and by using interventions to their full value. And it is also not nostalgic recidivism that could be tempted to see representations as something other than possible forms of handling the situation. We definitely prefer the game of clarification to the presumption of enlightenment.

Nevertheless living, thinking and feeling seem to have conditions imposed upon them in by their stabilized forms of mediatization in the possible application of the powers. They have media at their disposal; they set relations in motion - and in doing this they simultaneously have to rely on established relations that they are probably prepared to accept as living, thinking and feeling without realizing in every case that they are conditioned as media. And how!

The nostalgic and utopian urge to set processes in motion, to reach the heavenly imperturbability of a final entropy, is probably combined with establishing the intention of not accepting the situation until its conditions are recognized in their full scope, so that there is then the

possibility of being relieved of the precariousness of temperamental relations.
Once and for all.

5. Reason and consequence

5.1. Picture

We are convinced that our representation of the position and our investigations of the medium are simultaneously cross-faded with a repetition of other representations. We are working on the basis that the two powers of aesthesis and poiesis submissively appear at each moment of a representation, when the first forms of a representation are in fact emerging. Representation and the posing of the problem thus reach out to each other and are repeated by each other. Indeed, the problem faced by the two powers in their interferential relativity and constitutional diametry arise from the problems of all representability. The precariousness of aesthesis and poiesis with their uncertain competences is striking here: the situation allows itself to be represented, and with it the questionable nature of all handling.

Therefore our approach to the problem is overtaken by a history of representation, and our representation in its present form is obviously based on this. We are taken back to the beginnings. To ancient Egypt, for example, or to the ancient Greeks - among others. Through the availability of their representations. Through the tracks of what has subsequently somewhat short-sightedly asked to be called Indo-European or Indo-Germanic culture. They are there too. They are in place. As possibilities of aspectualization. As a continuation of the representation under changing conditions. As an underpinning for the situation through concrete handling. With the form.

Representation is reached at that legendary moment that precedes ours in terms of time, through the poietic act of a manifestation. Through the application of possible interventions. Through the updating of mediatization and medialization. Through the claim to autonomy of a form-giving subject that insists on possibilities of poiesis for itself and exhausts the conditions of aesthesis. And thus relativizes a preceding representation. Through a representation. And thinks about it. In the objectification and embodiment of that which fulfils the medial scope of creation, of *Gestaltung*. And becomes a theme. Of words and pictures, for example. As a stabilized trace that outwits the conditions of humanely mediatized life in its final state-form. In all its forms it is a collection of traces and evidence that in its sudden availability helps to determine the possibilities and conditions of the representations.

5.2. Legend

Representability seems to be based not least on the availability of several forms of representation. Here living, thinking and feeling turn out to be repeated recreations of links with the availability of possible representations. Here representations in their form are only one thing; the other thing is the conditions that are accepted or indeed not accepted here. This applies not only to the precarious systematizations of the interferential relativity of mediatization and medialization, which institutionalize the forms of availability. On the contrary the traditional concepts of living, thinking and feeling have to be examined as possibilities of this availability. With their conditions. Indeed, we can call living, thinking and feeling forms of this availability that are tempted to various representations and derive from different interferential relativities of the powers. Thus we break into the inner topography of living, thinking and feeling, which are swamped by traditional concepts like <sensation>, <memory>, <consciousness>, <soul> and other ideas that should be relativized in the context of the representability and competences of the powers. In any case we are tempted not to accept without reflection the traditional representations, which base themselves unquestioningly on a topology of externalization and internalization.

6. Beginning and moment

6.1. Picture

From the very first moment the creative act does not seem prepared to be satisfied with being able to represent

<something>, something or other. The situation is not accepted purely and simply when perception relativizes or sanctions the trace of the poietic act. Thus creative practice brings a theory of perception in its wake. In some form or other. The history of aesthetics! The history of cognition! Philosophy! Interferential relativity and constitutional diametry come into play in terms of the two powers as a result of the reflexive and prospective factor. And so does insight into the field of intervention of mediatization. Ultimately it is reflection and relativization that all at once declare <something> to be the object of a problem. Obviously the reason for this is not particularly that it is possible to assert all the time that there is something. Before our eyes. In our hands. The representations make the assertion valid. They raise the question of what something <is>. And this is done within a mediatized system, unlike other mediatizations, against the background of medialization.

It is at the very moment that the problem becomes obvious through the availability of representations, as a representation of possible and conditioning availabilities, that the medium as such is not accepted but immediately becomes a problem and a subject of discussion. Openness to question is intensified in the medium, indeed the so-called beginnings of the representations seem to circle uninterruptedly around the representability of the medium, and thus around the degree of consistency, around the claim to coherence, around the tendentiality of the statement and the consistency of meaning. For the representations are at the same time also an attempt to allot a function to the medium and to derive a value from it.

Here the assertion of identity turns out to be a symbolic indication of possible interference by mediatization and medialization from the start. Media collide in their organizations and mediatized constellations, for which nothing different is sought than: forms of relation - as a search for sense. As possibilities of representation. This is the only way in which the appearance of world-shaking concepts like nature, culture, reality, idea, shape, content, content form and others can be explained, which, for instance, mark out atomic, astronomical, arithmetical and geometrical territories that in their turn result in the systematization of mediatized constellations and the conditioning of interventions. through creative practice in the context of a theory of perception.

6.2. Legend

The intentionality of our representation ultimately compels us, through the availability of the representations, to start all over again. Certainly we do not intend to accept the beginnings of this representation in their form, to repeat them or even to continue them.

Territorial articulation goes hand in hand with traditional vocabulary and mediatized constellations, indeed with the institutionalized conditions of possible interventions and the claim to coherence that arises from them. Culture here! Nature there! Art here! Science there! Segregations that go back to exclusive systematization of mediatized constellations. And thus in every case to the right of identity of an object and an area that can be confirmed only through the forms of representation A dubious but devoted inheritance. Ontology! Metaphysics! The consequences are familiar: presentation of evidence, legitimation - and war.

With the beginnings of the representations they intensify an introduction of opposites into representability that the conditions of the relation neglect through repeated postulates of identity, claims to difference and territorial occupancies in their immanence of possible qualification. And they overlook the interferential relativity of the powers by absolutizing notions of <pure> perception.

However, it is now the availability of all things that focuses the question of how much it is possible to relativize the conditions of previous representations by representation. And not simply to reflect about it!

7. Perception and disturbance

7.1 Picture

Now, as soon as the creative act and its traces is relativized as circumstantial evidence of the very problem of representability by

the act of perception, the systems of interference and intervention seem concerned to subject perception to clear conditions. Bounds have to be set for relativizing and reflecting gestures by canonizing perception through the authority of mediatization. By taking appropriate measures. But what is now manifest and established as the rules of aesthesis, for example, consists usually only of severe restrictions on poiesis through which the interplay of the creative interventions and media conditions are supposedly adapted to the possibilities of perception. Rhythm, eurythmia, form and content, teleology! In this way, interferential relativity and constitutional diametry are stabilized in a figurative concordance that has to be justifiably reflected by the repetition of its conditions in the representations created, so that these can be confirmed. In their articulated balance. By invoking repetition. But this attempt at a binding inclusion of all available possibilities as a condition of mediatization seems inclined only to limit or extraterritorialize the insistence of medialization, in its full access to possible temptations, by differentiability and latent indifference. And then again, we can connect precisely these forms of limitation with the traditional concepts of nature and culture. These are difficult to relativize in their mediatized stabilizations of integrated system-representations, not least because aesthesis and poiesis directly overlook the momentary possibilities of interferential differentiation.

Such restrictions probably result from conventionalized handling of the situation of not accepting the powers in their possible dynamic of interferential relativity and constitutional diametry. The two powers' transgression factor in relativizing system representations is disturbing. Indeed, the two powers of aesthesis and poiesis are disturbing, purely and simply, because, as a result of the availability of medialization and the application of possible interventions they embody a latent readiness not to accept the situation.

7.1. Legend

The complexity of our original undertaking arises from a conviction that previous examinations of the two powers of aesthesis and poiesis have so far been essentially archaic beginnings, and are unthinkingly committed to anachronistic postulates. Aesthesis and poiesis are a thorn in the flesh of cognition.

Obviously the factor of relativizing perception is disturbing at that moment: the conditions of representation. And conversely: the unforeseen, indeed shattering traces and representations of intervening poiesis offend perception severely. Through the apparently omnipresent factor of temptation by possibility. By another possibility. Thus the tendencies of mediatization, which are reactionary in the actual sense of the word, provide order and clear circumstances by imposing sanctions on the authority of medialization. More seriously: the two powers are deprived of medialization in their competences. The insistence of tendentially anarchic possibilities is censored. We are tempted to say that the two powers are made ideological. And pathological.

Ultimately fear puts its mark on all these efforts. Fear of the medium. Fear of the possibilities of the powers and interventions that do not keep absolutely and eternally to stabilized conditions. Fear of a claim to difference that makes the assertion of identity seem provisional and frail. Fear of the possibilities of representing living, thinking and feeling.

This far-reaching set of problems intensifies in those forms of representation that are called <picture> or <image>. The repeatedly asserted likeness, as a discussion about mimesis, hides the actual problem of iconicity as a question of representability. And of doubling - of the difference? While the poietic power perfects a mediatized constellation in the coherence and consistency appropriate to it, suddenly several conflicting mediatization systems appear. Between them obviously <something> is being looked for in precisely the place where there is nothing to be found - whether it be an original or an idea. Or reality. Or nature.

The simultaneous availability of several mediatization systems makes our place in between obvious. In turn, this

produces a latent unease that is always present that tempts the right to identity and the territorial exclusiveness of the individual representation systems to forms of legitimation.

8. Writing and language

8.1. Picture

The plurality of possibilities of representation and the various conditions of mediatized constellations seem to be afraid of dynamization from the outset. But it is not so much dynamics and a provisional quality, differentiability and indifference, the heretical act of poiesis and aesthesis that trigger the desire for a gesture of legitimation; on the contrary, it is the mediatized stabilization norms of arrangements and relations. They obviously succumb to the compulsion for legitimation. They have to be justified, in their claim to coherence and their degree of consistency. In their claim to be lasting, responsible and valid. They have to anticipate the possibilities of relativizing and reflecting, and close the gap caused by the missing argument inconspicuously. The stubbornness of insistent repetition obviously has a system.

And this is the kind of thing that writing addresses. It articulates laws. It conveys commandments. It drafts treaties. It judges the extent of tolerability. It discusses the conditions of the possibilities. It offers to help to guarantee the stabilization of relations in their minimal organization and complex constellations. It takes on the responsibility of producing a world picture that meaningfully corresponds to a copy of the results of its perception. It is tempted to legitimize mediatized systems and their hierarchies unquestioningly, while not failing to consider the advantage of conceding primacy to itself - not least against the background of a randomly biblical return to origins. However, the original pairing of possible custom and prescriptive customary use has been hopelessly discussed of late. And that in language!

In fact the linguistic act imposes severe conditions on the representations that are to be understood by living, thinking and feeling. Thus for example thought and language should be resolved in reason as a regulative in organic courtly love, integrally imposing a hierarchy. In the psychoanalytical act of rescuing archaic depths of feeling it is thinking and speaking that are allotted the role of decoding things that have supposedly been suppressed, and illuminating the boundaries and coinages of aesthesis and poiesis. It is representations by speech and of language that have to produce what living, thinking and feeling have in mind. And yet of course our concepts <living, thinking and feeling> can belong to nothing other than language: media! Dependent on the conditions of mediatization in every case.

8.1 Legend

The representation emergency is a considerable one: we are tempted to use the mediatized system of a language to represent a set of problems that establishes a mimetic analogy between living, thinking and feeling. By the act of a language that asserts that in this way it is on the tracks of so-called thinking and feeling without living, thinking and feeling ever getting a word in here. Without the mediating authority of our language,]??case - ? von missing] a mediatized system that seems to drown out others. Or not to perceive them. And at the same time the representations language also play with the tempting possibility of being able to relativize living, thinking and feeling in their existing mediatization forms and to be able to reflect about this. Mythology!

The symptom is obvious: one representation is not enough! Discharging the possibilities and conditions of representability by the claims of a single representation suggests the temptation to legitimation. We accept the situation by expressing that we rely directly on the multiplicity of representations and of mediatized systems. And thus the prospects of continuation and implementation.

Our representation is not enough. The plurality of contradictory representations and the desire for repetition are paired with the consequent necessity to break away from unified representations. From the uniqueness of language. And behind all this the hopeless failure of the meta-discourse and of exegesis is lying in wait. The established contracts between

planes of organizations and constellations have started to crumble because the [??]genuineness [?? something missing - plural verb] of a first plane that [is] established as living, thinking and feeling or as basic postulates of direct nature or reality, can no longer be maintained where they are represented and accepted exclusively by a second plane as such. This should come to a definite end with the vital postulate of cultural or natural units.

9. Opposite and present

9.1. Picture

Ultimately we can be tempted to assert the opposite of our state of mind in terms of the situation at any point: we can produce justifiable doubts about readiness to relativize the familiar state of things. It does not seem to be a widespread attitude to reflect about the possibilities and conditions of the conflicting powers of aesthesis and poiesis, about the interventions and interferential consequences on every plane that can be conceived or felt. Too much may be at stake. But what speaks against it? Life?

Living, thinking and feeling hold on to <themselves> and <something> that should be legitimized not least by invocative recourse to natural prejudices and cultural integrity. There is stubborn resistance to the questionable nature of all representability and the provisional nature of all representations. Randomly or inordinately discredited dynamizations that are stylized and elevated as universal threats with destabilizing dangers, are resisted by the arsenal of impregnable embodiments and territorial occupations, which have ideological and pathological currency in their application without reflection. Mythological assertions of identity appeal to traditional differences that are unquestioningly attached to blood and soil. In turn, declarations of autonomy lead, in their emancipatory acquittal of <something>, to a finalization that is [?sind] directed at a categorical deletion, if not even an intentional annihilation of all relations and their mutual interdependence.

Standpoint and representation remain bound to the prehypostasized archetype of the reconnoitred territory, of the identified object, of their own view, which has to be defended as mediatized completion. The precarious nature of the situation is met by the frivolity of those methods and the gravity of that piece of artillery, both of which have purely and simply failed ever since they started to be used: standardization and generalization, through which the disturbing trace element of the missing argument is [?werden] withheld from living, thinking and feeling to a certain extent because aesthesis and poiesis are intended to be <dazzled> in their competences.

But it is rare, we can now assert in turn, for such tendencies to be unambiguously contradicted in this way. And indeed in word and picture. With appropriately relativizing and reflecting interventions.

The reciprocity that has been represented now swings, present and up-to-date, between a language game with nuances and affected seriousness, between assailing complexities and welcome simplifications. At first the availability of divergent representations that has been repeatedly mentioned here breaks the cosy frame within which a so-called culture with its model of reality and system of references could develop undisturbed as something that is symbolically and representatively complete. The quality of availability that plays possibilities off against conditions in fact reduces everything to confusion. Ultimately it is this that tempts us to relativize and reflect in comparing the representations in their heterogeneous forms. Like this and differently - in handing the reciprocal quality.

A conflict now seems to break out repeatedly between established concepts of mediatization and medialization as interference problems. Looking for a hypothetical balance. Thus for example the direct recourse to the interim quality of medialization in its complete availability to possible indifference intensifies the contrast between inner and outer worlds, while the prescriptive programmes of mediatization as patris and matrix are not prepared to tolerate immissions and so-called foreign bodies.

But the undecided quality in this reciprocity of possible positions which - on the basis of different interferences, frames of

reference and intervention instructions - which is consolidated by the formation of exclusive paradigms, turns out to be the actual crisis of the present. Indeed, every aspect of the present seems to go hand in hand with a sense of supposed crisis against the background of reciprocity. And the familiar forms of representation are, once more since their ominous beginnings, are no longer in any form as a faithful mirror of an indexed crisis. They turn out to be a prototypical handling of the crisis, which has to be named, discussed and not least averted.

9.2 Legend

We intend to represent the characteristic of creating opposites in all its forms. This will mean that incompatibilities, tensions, contradictions are juxtaposed and played off against each other as aspectualizations of handling the conditions of the relations. This process is linked with the intention of recording opposites in their extremes of conditional representation, not least in order to shed light on a striking latency of totality that obviously goes hand in hand with the conditions of representability as a form of temptation. Here relativizing and reflecting could turn out to be a helpless attempt to avoid having always to accept forms of representation that are already stable and incessantly insistent. But what is set against it as a result? Or what is added by it? Something? Something different?

In contrast with the current disparity of specific representations, mostly epiphenomenally reduced and derivative in their face value [?Nennwert], quoting and relativizing specific arrangements, constellations and organizations, we intend not only to represent opposition, individuality and generalization, but - it goes without saying - to reflect about how these forms of handling and representation come about at all. Thus the concept of the <context> is to be worked as hard as possible.

But <topicality> and <updating> are in urgent need of being addressed in their marked availability in terms of forms of representation. They will make it possible to draft a <history> of the medium that concentrates [?konzentrieren] on handling the authorities of medialization and mediatization and the powers of aesthesis and poesis.

Reciprocity can turn out to be the tacit condition of representability, in that the shocks have to be absorbed in some form through all the present as a repeated crisis. Thus concepts like <hierarchy> and concepts of a vertical and a horizontal <tradition> come into play; they probably determine the degree of stabilization of mediatized constellations and organizations as chronic and topic parameters.

The crisis as present, the presence of a crisis obviously affect the elasticity and capacity of the context. We logically insist: it could well turn out that with a view to current availabilities and reciprocities one culture is no longer enough as a means of systematically seizing power over all elements of the present. The canon of mediatization, the established interferences between mediatization and medialization take steps that are too short within a cultural context, they are marching on the spot. The possibilities of an intersystematic or transsystematic disposition now seem to be juxtaposed with the conditions of referential integration.

10. Having and existing

10.1. Picture

It is rare for there to be such an appeal to <thinking in contexts>. The concept itself indicates a transgression of existing contextualization and defines its immanent border. The fact that now <everything> is supposed to be relative and has to be in a <context> in some form is not only a truism but a modern mythologeme for as long as it is not made clear what types of relation and structural systems are meant by context. Where the teleological totality now promises a direction for thought, it is also perfectly clear where such magisterial tendentiality is coming from. Again from a context in which we are the only people who could be meant. We ourselves.

We are of the opinion that the availability of the possibilities, and weighing up the conditions, opens up a different perception of

the existing contexts for us. We have the impression that we are seeing the context <in a new way> or <differently>, although without having even an approximate idea of what this context <is>.

Here the reflecting and reflexive gesture makes it possible for us to break into the predominant context from all sides in order to a certain extent to make <everything> that is intended to be an object of living, thinking and feeling a subject for discussion. As media. Here we are not simply evading all assurances that are granted to the systematic contexts of nature and culture. And thus the phenotypic assertions of being and axioms of intervention as well. We are questioning the current opinion that having media at one's disposal means the same as the advantageous situation of having <something>. And being <something>.

The uncertainties of the present derive not least from a chronological, topological and semantic-taxonomic exhaustion of archaeological underpinning and postulates that have supported previous assertions of coherence. If radicalization of the reflecting and relativizing gesture can now ultimately produce a form of <lack of context>, then the guarantor <human being>, as a medium, still stands in the way of such unfounded matter. Human beings have it in hand. It is true that this is a self-appointed context that as an integral power and as postulated individuality should have the view of complete contextuality at its disposal.

Now in the mean time there is no reason to continue simply to accept that the <human being> is the measure of all things in some form for as long as the constituting premises are not simultaneously at stake as an ideal context, in order to reflect about the conditions and possibilities of the medium <human being> and to relativize the acceptance of an integral self. If the claim to autonomy of the assertion of being exhausts itself as a medium in having living, thinking and feeling at its disposal as an amalgam of complex constellations, then it can definitely be asserted that medial reversibility applies in every case, in other words: the medial constellations and syncretic powers of living, thinking and feeling have media at their disposal that we do not necessarily have at our disposal, for which the medium <human being> is one medium among others. In any case the recreating of a link with what is induced as <human being> with living, thinking and feeling scarcely legitimizes the aporia of a categorical <existence> outside interferential conditions. Reciprocal availability is based on a degree of involvement for which we do not anticipate the ultimate accolade.

10.2 Legend

We propose not only to expose the existing conditions, nostalgic and utopian projections to detailed review as a context, we also declare that the context from which such undertakings are taken up is questionable. This will not just mean that the current heavenly bodies called living, thinking and feeling are thrown into confusion, the medium <human being> will no longer be accepted in its traditional constitution. Thus the ancestral series of claims to identity and allocations of difference based on historicizing, ethnological, sexualized and anthropocentric legitimations will turn out to be problematical.

But not only that. The consequences should be considerable for traditional ideas of rational or existential integrity. We should like to express it experimentally like this, although we still do not have the appropriate formulation: we <are>, as the place and time of an articulated asymmetrical diametry and of an interferential relativity, only partially identical with what we assert we live, think and feel. And vice versa. Living, thinking and feeling involve themselves only partially with us in their intersystematic availability of syncretic powers. And the feeling of existence can be based on precisely this omnipresent perception of a difference. And so what we perceive and produce is at the same time more or less than what we live, think and feel. We are and remain a welcome game for the interferences of the powers. Our assertion of autonomy probably corresponds with only one of the possible, reflecting, ways of handling the situation through which we are determined as living, thinking and feeling. And the self is a design, a diametrical, interferential constellation that can be

relativized by the powers of aesthesis and poiesis at any time.

What we ultimately propose to do <by this means> is beyond us. We repeat it in this context, moving from the context in which we are used to talking about it: one's own standpoint is not enough. The intention is in fact too much for what is available to our possibilities not least because we are not inclined simply to accept the conditions of traditional representability. And so in this context in which everything is completely questionable we no longer accept ourselves. Now this has less to do with us, with our boundaries and limitations, which are of course also in play, but with temptation by the present situation, which relativizes us and shakes the context on which we rely in order to perceive and produce our powers. But we offer no prospect of a new context. We have no idea! We do not feel inspired by currents of faith or lights of hope. On the contrary. We cling only to uninterrupted temptation by questionableness.

We cannot get rid of the justifiable impression that the apostrophized crisis is the result of a present that is attempting with its updatings and aspectualizations, in their relativizations and reflections, quite simply to make itself clear about the interferential relativity of all relation. In a practical and theoretical sense. What is to be gained by this cannot - once more - be predicted. Situative ethics? Dynamic constellations with changing hierarchies? Roles that are filled appropriately in aktantial terms from case to case? Different identities? Identical differences? We purely and simply have no concepts for this. And no ideas.

We are undertaking <something>. That is all. Here <something> does not mean only the possible and conditional mediation of complex and syncretic interventions, through which living, thinking and feeling are obviously determined in that their claim to reciprocal sympathy remains bound to the forms of the relation. As possibilities of perceiving and producing. In their possibilities of being perceived and produced. As media that have the authorities of medialization and mediatization at their disposal: a spatial-temporal endowment of the interim quality, which, on all sides of possible outline qualities, front and back, top and bottom, left and right, at the beginning and at the end, is <there> in its repetition.

As a theme. As a context in the context with all questionableness. As a temptation to handle all this. As an intention towards further, dialogue problems, publications and exhibitions that are herewith based on the availability of and decisions about forms of play between the represented aspectualization of the questions and the possibilities of their forms of representation. Under the conditions of representability in each case: as something called into present being. As a comparison. As poietic experiments and temptations

ÖBlurbÓ for the ÖMedium - a world in betweenÓ project (Michael Pfister)

1.

We are sitting in a restaurant and have chosen a particular dish. We are writing a letter, choosing words and putting them together. We are looking at the sea and notice a ship approaching on the horizon. We are waiting to get on a plane and sit down next to someone at the departure gate, get into conversation and marry that someone shortly afterwards. We are Robespierre, and amidst the frenzy of the Revolution we start to wonder what order will follow this general chaos. What trivial things ultimately decide what is to happen. Whether we feel that we are acting ourselves or being led by circumstance, whether we see the matter as nothing or something is not so crucial and often not open to decision. Sadness about the loss of all the other possibilities sets in as soon as we choose a single possibility. Men of action perhaps don't even notice. But more tender plants, incompetent and impulsive, do not want to tie themselves down: ÖYou see nothing about me that indicated a particular choice in life. I am still standing outside the door of life, knocking and knocking, admittedly not very impetuously, and just listening eagerly . . . Ó (Robert Walser) Openness and emptiness. Mingling and vacuum. Stories of ÖmissesÓ opportunities are also to be found in any story about decisions, about forks in the road. Any setting of points reflects

the witch-hunt of the variants. A poem consisting of all the entries in the Oxford English Dictionary . . . Modern physics hints at parallel worlds as a result of quantum physics and the theory of relativity. If it were possible to travel fast enough to travel in time I could kill my grandfather in the past before my father was born. In one world I am born, but I prevent precisely that in the other. Two possibilities that exclude each other become reality. 'If there is a sense of reality then there must be a sense of possibility as well,' says Musil. Who would not like to be drawn into distrusting the 'fixed divisions and forms of life'? Do you agree with yourself when you say what you think? Or rather, when you 'live hypothetically'? 'Histoire hypothétique' as non-reactionary nostalgia, experimental thinking and fantasy that is not compelled to be useful, utopias that get by without welfare committees and tank invasions. The 'human being as the epitome of his possibilities, the potential human being, the unwritten poem of his existence' confronts the 'human being as document, as reality and character'. Humanism and anti-humanism: man without qualities and qualities without man. Perception and reality. We know now that we cannot believe everything we read in the paper. That CNN does not necessarily let the war flicker into our living-rooms more authentically. We also know that the world is not just getting smaller, it's getting more virtual too. Perhaps precisely for this reason we are a little fonder of the original, genuine reality with a sense of itself. We can still sniff little flowers, stick pins in ourselves and even jump off a bridge in person without taking leave of the world. This may be enough to show us that reality still exists, and that we can experience it - as observers, consumers, searchers for meaning - at any time we wish.

Kant used to be interested in the conditions of the possibility of experience and (identical with it) the objects of experience. Heidegger sums up this constellation - the unity of thought and view as the essence of experience - as a circle: 'Experience is events circling within themselves, whereby that which is within the circle is opened up. But this openness is nothing other than something between - between us and the thing.' This something between is outlined only briefly at the end of Heidegger's 'Die Frage nach dem Ding'. It is said that we always moved in the something between that is between man and thing, that the something between exists only while we are moving to it, and that the something between is not a bridge, but a leap-ahead or a throw-back (in other words determined by time).

The 'medium - a world in between' project moves within this somewhere between in more detail (not only between man and thing) and amplifies the question about the 'conditions of possibility' with the question about the 'possibilities of the conditions'.

2

Medium is everything and nothing. Everything that is perceived or produced. Everything that helps the 'thing' to come into being. In Gestalt psychology, for example, the 'medium-thing' distinction corresponds to the relationship between (back-)ground and figure. When considered from a point of view that addresses not just the singular but above all the plural (if not the total), round about and behind become: in between. In a constellation of relations that refer to each other reciprocally it is a question of gaps. We will also have to ask whether difference does not have a slight lead in the dialectic of identity and difference. Dialectical logic joins in, but fortunately sometimes renounces the subtlety of foresight and eyeing up the system as a whole. Could it be that Hegel's 'identity of identity and non-identity' takes shape(s) here, somewhere in between.

The project makes a distinction between two planes with equal rights: a fixed structure of identities and differences, as something that has taken form (spoken language, film, thoughts etc.), and confronts it with dissolution, pre-beginnings, virtuality, the processuality of fluid structures that can be discussed only after they have evolved into fixed forms.

Science tends to produce catalogues of what it does not know (yet) from time to time. Nobel laureate Richard Ernst identifies open question including: 'How did life begin?', 'Why are proteins folded as they are folded?' or 'Is the earth's biochemistry unique, or could there be other possibilities?' From a different and the same point of view one could also ask: 'Why do we build our churches as we

build them? Ó, ÓWhy do certain cultures invent television and others not? Ó, ÓHow do value systems emerge? Ó Nietzsche thought he noticed a thrust that was linked with concrete historical assessments: ÓThat individual philosophical concepts are not random, not something that grows of its own accord, but grow up with reference and relation to each other (. . .) is revealed not least in the fact of how surely a whole range of philosophers tend to keep to a certain basic scheme of possible philosophies, (. . .) something in them leads them, something drives them along one after the other . . . Ó The ÓMedium - a world in betweenÓ project asks about hierarchies without establishing hierarchies, and asks whether there is not a certain pressure on what has not yet been fixed: is there a pre-trace, for example in the sense of the Ódepth structureÓ in the semiotics of Algirdas Greimas, syntactical (rather than semantic) universals or at least functors, a pre-grammar of recognition and representation on the basis of the powers of aesthesis (input) and poiesis (output)? What leads to certain events, to exclusive definitions? Are there compelling factors beyond causality, metaphysics and ideology?

The many dualisms and dichotomies in natural history and the history of ideas are particularly striking. How would it be if there were a third sex (or even more) as well as male and female sexuality? To what extent is Western thought influenced by the exclusion of the ÓbarbaricÓ, by the drawing of a fundamental boundary between own and alien. ÓBebarbarweqaÓ said Antiphon the Sophist - we Greeks sometimes ÓbarbarizeÓ as well. If the only alternative to this world is not the next, then the eros of crossing over perhaps functions as entry into an intermediate empire of the ÓneuterÓ (neither of the two) or of ÓuterqueÓ (both, the ? and the ?). Neutrality and opulence.

In all this we are always dealing with perception and production, with cognition and action. The categorical separation of theory and practice is dismissed. Design - creative practice - turns out to be an intermediate area that is ideally suited in its concreteness to this traditional schism. An art of division that separates so that it can mix better and mixes so that it can separate better. This is not escapism by the imaginary and the aesthetic, not a shrugging of the shoulders when faced with the supposed ÓseriousÓ problems of so-called ÓrealityÓ brought about by the failure of the Enlightenment or the post-Modern Óanything goesÓ. It does not need to be a rejection of any form of rationality if possibility and reality are not mediated with each other in favour of a mythology of reason, but to bring possibility as reality and reality as possibility into play with each other. Seriousness and game are not mutually exclusive, but each radicalizes the other.

3

Inflation of meaning? What is truth? What do the stars tell us? What does this mistake mean, or that muscular convulsion? First we interpret things, then we interpret the interpretation. We cannot manage without meaning, but: what guarantees its honesty? How can we introduce breaks into the marathon of interpretation? What could be more threatening than universal and thus infinite en- or decodability?

We cannot get out of this context. Every perception, every action draws a cosmogony in its wake or a political approach, a kernel of meaning, an aesthetic declaration. Context accelerates classification. A refusal to classify oneself once and for all changes the context. Criticism of tradition is logically part of the project. Anyone who is attentive to genealogy and processes of emergence (to the Óother possibilitiesÓ) could see through the traditional narrows of cultural-historical development, run counter to them, possibly even avoid them. The dominance of the difference says: none of that is it. And yet such a lack of position does not intend to become a new position; presence cannot be marked by dismissing presence. Not one more piece of excess in the spirit of the endless conquest of metaphysics. This project is both smaller (more regional) and larger (more playful), but in any case it is in perspective.

Things that contemplation makes possible and that challenge thought are collected (to order and to dissolve, as product and as matrix). Any collector faces a possible hotchpotch. Perhaps precision and freshness can only be achieved if there is no tension caused by sheer terror of being random. The power of chance as a matrix of necessity. Radical scepticism and naïve bonhomie are siblings.

What is available is observed, questioned, interpreted, shifted and translated from the point of view of what falls between two stools and pursues an existence in between them. Could it not be possible to reach definitions that do not close, but open? What Cupid is able to pair off question and answer in such a way that their night of love produces a cross between question and answer? Starting from difference constantly and frequently recurs; at the parting of the ways, but also in the middle, in things that are undecided, suspended, unripe and impure, schizoid, multiple, masked, hermaphrodite, monstrous.